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ARGUMENT

I.

Appellant Has Marshaled the Evidence.

Though Appellant (hereinafter "Loren") has asserted multiple causes for
appeal, Appellee (hereinafter "Oksana") argues against only one. She argues that
Loren has not met the requirements to "marshall the evidence." See Appellee Brief,
p. 1. The evidence, however, demonstrates that he has.

"[W]hen appealing a highly fact dependent issue, the appellant has a
duty to marshal the evidence. This duty requires an appellant to
marshal all of the facts used to support the trial court's finding and then
show that these facts cannot possibly support the conclusion reached
by the trial court, even when viewed in the light most favorable to the
appellee. An appellant may not simply cite to the evidence which
supports his or her position and hope to prevail."
Waymantv. Howard, 144 P.3d 1147, 1149-50 (Utah 2006). Loren has fulfilled his

duty in marshalling the evidence by identifying every piece of evidence that is cited
in both the trial Court's written decision and its Findings of Fact arid Conclusions of

Law in support of its custody decision and then has shown that the manifest weight

of the evidence is overwhelmingly contrary to the lower court's decision.

See

Appellant's Opening Brief. Specifically, Loren has shown that this is not a matter of
a "he said, she said contest" where every evidentiary hair is split and the court is left

to decide which split hair has greater weight. Rather, Loren has shown that the
admission of uncorroborated and false accusations of child abuse was prejudicial
onanist him.

The trial court is required to consider several factors when imposing the "best
interests of the child".

Thorpe v. Jensen, 817 P.2d 387, 390 (Utah App. 1991).

Prevalent among those factors is child abuse. Id. Courts across the country have

ruled that false allegations of abuse used as a strategy to win custody constitute
child abuse in and of themselves by wrongfully denying the child adequate access
to the accused parent and by denying the accused parent his fundamental parental

rights, exposing him to wrongful sanctions of law, damage to reputation and other
such consequences. The end result of such actions is a willful deprivation of the

noncustodial parent's visitation rights. M[A] custodial parent's willful deprivation of the
noncustodial parent's visitation rights constitutes "an act so inconsistent with the best

interests of the children as to, per se, raise a strong probability that the [parent] is
unfit to act as a custodial parent". Entwistle v. Entwistle, 61 A.D.2d 380. 384-385
(NY 1978). The same has been found true >n other courts. See Dura v. Dure, 392

Mass. 574 (1984); see also C.P. Kindregan, Jr. & M.L. Inker, Family Law and
Practice § 47.12, at 366-367 & n. 13 (2d ed. 1996),
Notwithstanding the impact of this factor, it is apparent from the findings cited

by Loren in his opening brief, that the trial court based it's custodial decision, in part,
upon the unsupported allegations of abuse. See Appellant's Brief, pp. 14, 18-41.

If I oren has fallen short of the appellate court's standard of review in marshalling the
evidence, Loren respectfully reminds the reviewing Court of the standard as cited in

his initial Brief at pg. 22. Quoting Woodward v. Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474, 477 (Utah
App. 1991), the Barnes court, held that "[i]f the findings are legally inadequate the

exercise of marshalling the evidence in support of the findings becomes futile and

the appellant is under no obligation to marshal." Barnes v. Barnes. 857 P.2d 257
(Utah 1993). "The process of marshaling the evidence serves the important function

of reminding litigants and appellate courts of the broad deference owed to tne fact
finder at trial." State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 739 (Utah App. 1990). However, tins

Court should only grant this deference when the findings of fact are sufficiently
detailed to disclose the evidentiary basis for the court's decision. See State v.

Lovegren. 798 P.2d 767, 771 (Utah App. 1990) (trial court decision afforded no
deference when findings inadequate). See also Alired v. Ailred. 797 P 2d 1108,
1111 (Utah App. 1990) (failure to enter detailed findings concerning child support
determination constitutes abuse of trial court's discretion). There is, in effect, no

need for an appellant to marshal the evidence when the findings are so inadequate

that they cannot be meaningfully challenged as factual determinations. In other
words, the way to attack findings which appear to be complete and which are
sufficiently detailed is to marshal the supporting evidence and then demonstrate the
evidence is inadequate to sustain such findings. But where the findings are not of
that caliber, appellant need not go through a futile marshaling exercise. Rather,

appellant can simply argue the legal insufficiency ofthe court's findings as framed."
As in VJoodward. Loren argues that the trial Court's findings of fact wen;

iuyallv insufficient. In his brief, Loren presented evidence that the Court contradicted

itself by indicating it had heard enough1 and that it did not intend to go back and
review the accusations of abuse when, in fact, the Court later did go back and review
the accusations of abuse holding that Loren probaoly was guilty. Decision, pp. 8.

Then, as indicated by Oksana. the Court on other occasions reluctantly invited Loren
to pursue additional questions if he deemec necessary. Appellee's Reply Brief at
12. This had a confusing and chilling effect on Loren.

The chilling effect was influenced by previous experience that Loren had with

his attorney, Kim Walpole, in which Kim explicitly expressed fear of alienating the
judge and told Loren that justice is based more on the relationship with the judge
than it is based on the strength of the case. Rooted in that fear, Loren deferred to
Judge Pamela Hefernan's wishes that he not continue to delve into the issue of false

allegations of child abuse. Loren attempted to read between the lines and tried to

understand what the judge "really wanted". Loren, upon being challenged by the
judge as to the necessity of proving false abuse, did not pursue further questioning

or develop additional evidence as shown at R.I. p. 152-24 ("I will defer to your

judgment on that and Iwill end further questioning at this point."). In Brady v. Brady,
886 P.2d 104,(1994). in reversing the trial court the reviewing Court found (hat
contradictory instructions created a high potential for confusion". By creating an

environment of confusion and mixed signals. Loren was not able to fully develop
Court Transcript at pp. 149-5, 16 ("I think your point has been made"). 18
i to me they're just accusations without basis"), 24 ("there's not a lot I can do in
ierms Oi tOKing tnat into account m my decision"); 151-15 ("1 just think at some
point there's diminishing returns").

highly relevant facts, facts that were necessary for a legally sufficient conclusion by
the Court.

As in Woodward, the trial Court makes "conclusory" statements but without the

legally sufficient supporting evidence. Woodward. 823 P.2d at 477. The Woodward
court provides that findings which state that "[appellant's] contacts with the child
have been inconsistent, sporadic and token," that "it is evident to the court that the
natural Father has abdicated his responsibility as a parent," and that "the court is
convinced that the father's conduct has led to the destruction of the parent/child

relationship" were conclusory and provide no insight into the evidentiary basis for the
trial court's decision, id. They further render effective appellate review unfeasible.
See Adams v. Board of Review, No. 900597, slip op. at 6-7 (Utah Ct. App. Nov. 5,

1991). The trial court in this case similarly relied only upon conclusory findings, as
explained in Appellant's Opening Brief.
The issue before the court in Woodward was whether Fazzio had abandoned

the parties' minor child (R.A.F.). See Woodward, 823 P.2d 474. The Woodward
court indicated that the findings made by the trial court should have set for:h specific

facts-subsidiary facts-bearing on that issue, id. In similar manner, the findings of
the instant case make comparable conclusory statements that Loren is the less

cooperative parent but without the supporting subsidiary facts. See Findings of f act
and Conclusions of Law., p. 5 f. In fact, Loren had presented evidence at trial that

were diametrically opposed to the trial Court's findings wherein he snowed that he
.velcomed a cooperative relationship R.I.. p. 32-22 (wantee to avoid mudsl'.ncmg

contest, counter to cooperative parenting); but Oksana was totally opposed to a

cooperative relationship. R.I., p.145-11 ("I would prefer no visitation"): 145-19 (I
believe that cooperative parenting is completely out of the question.")

Other

unsupported and legally inadequate statements by the Court include statements that

allegations of past abuse "probably" occurred but were unsupported by legally
adequate evidence. Decision, p. 8.

The Court, in its decision, not only awarded sole physical custody to Oksana.
but removed joint legal custody from Loren without ever explaining why such

decision to remove joint legal custody was made or providing legally adequate
evidence to support such a decision. Decision, p. 9. No analysis was made showing

that joint legal custody was not in the best interests of the child or that by allowing
Loren to have joint legal custody would somehow cause harm to the child. As such,
the decision by the lower court must be reversed.

II.

Constitutional Challenges to Denial of Parental Rights.

Parents have a constitutional right to manage "the care, custody and control
of their children." Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d

49 (2000). The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that this right is "perhaps the
o.dest of the mndnmental liberty interests." Id. at 65, 120 S.Ct. 2054. This liberty

interest encompasses parents' personal choices in family life beginning with their
right to marry and conceive and extending to their right to control the education of

their children and raise thorn according to the dictates of their religion. See. e.g..

Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745. 753, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982)
(recognizing that freedom of personal choice in matters of family life is a
fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment); Wisconsin v.
Y Mer. 406 U.S 205, 232-33. 92 S.Ct. 1526, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972) (holding that

compulsory high school attendance interfered with Amish parents' fundamental
rights to raise their children according to the dictates of their religion); Stanley v.
Illinois. 405 U.S. 645, 651, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972) (recognizing the

"rights to conceive and raise one's children"); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters. 268 U.S.
510, 534-35, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925) (holding that a parent's liberty
interest extends to the choice of education and upbringing of children); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-401, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923) (holding that

the right to "marry, establish a home and bring up children" is protected by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and includes the parents' right to

control the education of their children).

This fundamental right is no different ior a

divorced parent than it is for married parents.

The Court should recognize that "[t]he natural right of visitation jointly enjoyed

by the noncustodial parent and the child is more precious than any property right."
Rt-^nick v. Zoldan. 134 A D.2d 246, 247 (2d Dept. 1987).

It should additionally

recognize that the best interests of the child would be furthered by the child being

nuitured and guided by both of the natural parents." Bostinto v. Bostinto. 207 A.D 2d
471, 472 (2d Dept. 1994).

Indeed, a custodial parent's interference with the

relationship between a child and a noncustodial parent has been said to be "an act

so inconsistent with the best interests of the child as to per se raise a strong

probability that the offending party is unfit to act as a custodial parent." Maloney v.
Moloney, 208 A.D.2d 603, 603-604 (2d Dept. 1994).

Oksana fails to adequately respond to the constitutional challenges posed by
Loren and which fall outside the marshaling of evidence requirement cited by
Oksana.

Each of these constitutional challenges provides further basis for the

reversal of the trial court's decision.

Oksana used false allegations of abuse to persuade, influence or otherwise

move the trial Court to not only award sole custody to Oksana but to remove Loren's
joint legal rights as a parent, effectively relegating Loren to a lesser role in the life of

his natural daughter than Oksana's new husband. This effectively removes Loren's
constitutional right to parent his child. Within the framework of the status quo at the

time of the trial Court's decision, Loren had been awarded approximately 15%
minimum visitation time with his daughter while Oksana and her new husband were

left with 85% of the time. In addition to being denied meaningful parenting time.
Loren was also deprived of any legal standing with his daughter, relegating him to
a role of a visitor, not a parent, in (ho life of his daughter. This should be reversed.

Sole custody should not be awarded a parent who would willfully, maliciously,
and knowingly propogatc false allegations of abuse to alienate the child from the

other parent and to obtain a favorable custody award. This does not comply with the
standard of "best interests of the child". Millions of fathers, are denied parental
rights under the guise that trial courts, when dealing with domestic matters, have

near absolute discretion to award custody. Though it serves judicial economy
and the livelihoods of attorneys, it fails to serve justice and denies those parents
one of the most fundamental and inalienable rights known to mankind, the right
to the association, care and nurturing of a child, as provided for by the
Fourteenth Amendment. The supreme court, in various rulings cited by Loren,
has required a standard of extreme close scrutiny before denying parental rights
and such close scrutiny is not magically eliminated in the case of divorce. In the

instant case, not only has Loren been denied custody but he has also been
denied any legal rights to decision making affecting the child.

This has been

accomplished without any regard to the close scrutiny standards of the supreme
court and has been done without legally adequate evidence to support such
harsh and extreme denial of parental rights.
CONCLUSION

Pursuant to the foregoing arguments and law, Appellant respectfully
requests this Court reverse the error made by the Second District Court in this
matter and award Appellant joint custody of his daughter.
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day of September, 2007.
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